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THE DEMISE OF THE U.N. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REGIME
*
TO DEPRIVE TERRORISTS OF FUNDING
Jimmy Gurulé†
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the
growing prevalence of terrorist activities around the world, the U.N. Security Council devised and implemented a global economic sanctions regime to
freeze the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of individuals
and entities who finance and support acts of terrorism. Pursuant to Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 1267
(1999) and 1333 (2000), which impose duties on States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism. The international economic sanctions regime established by these resolutions has been characterized as “the sole
vehicle for truly global action against the twin threats of Al-Qaida and the
Taliban.” To date, pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1333, approximately
490 individuals and entities have been placed on a list, known as the “Consolidated List,” and their assets are required to be frozen by Member
States.
Despite its importance in combating global terrorism, the Security
Council’s asset freeze program has reached a critical juncture. Senior
counter-terrorism officials are less enthusiastic about the economic sanctions regime than ever before. Increasingly fewer names are being submitted for designation under Resolutions 1267 and 1333, and terrorist-related
assets are no longer being frozen. As a result, al Qaeda and the Taliban
retain ample funding to sustain their lethal operations and finance deadly
terrorist attacks. In short, based on every objective measurement, the U.N.
counter-terrorism sanctions program appears to be failing. Unless significant measures are taken to hold States accountable for their failure to
comply with their duty to freeze terrorist assets, the anti-terrorist financing
sanctions regime will cease to be relevant in the fight against global terrorism.
This article examines the evolution, operation, and implementation
of the U.N. sanctions regime to freeze terrorist assets, and makes several
important recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the counterterrorism sanctions program.
*

Excerpts of this article have been taken from the author’s book, entitled: UNFUNDING
TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF GLOBAL TERRORISM (2009).
†
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DUTY TO FREEZE TERRORIST-RELATED
ASSETS
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the
growing prevalence of terrorist activities around the world, the United Nations Security Council devised and implemented a global economic sanctions regime to freeze the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of
individuals and entities who finance and support acts of terrorism. Pursuant
to its Chapter VII authority,1 the Security Council has adopted numerous
resolutions imposing duties on Member States to prevent and suppress the
financing of terrorism.2 Among other things, these resolutions require coun1
The U.N. Charter confers on the Security Council the “primary responsibility” for the
maintenance of international peace and security. See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. Article 41,
Chapter VII, authorizes the Security Council to impose measures not involving the use of
armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security. Id. art. 41. Article 25
provides: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” Id. art. 25. Additionally, article
103 provides that “[i]n the event of conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the . . . Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the . . . Charter shall prevail.” Id. art. 103.
2
The major U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted to prevent the financing of terrorism include Resolutions 1267 and 1333 (imposing a financial embargo on the Taliban, al
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and their associates). See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267
(Oct 15, 1999) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1267]; S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec.
19, 2000) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1333]. Security Council resolutions adopted to strengthen
and enhance the economic sanctions regime against al Qaeda and Taliban include: S.C. Res.
1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001) (establishing a Monitoring Group to monitor
the implementation of measures imposed by Resolutions 1267 and 1333); S.C. Res. 1390,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002) (continuing the financial embargo) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 1390]; S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002) (recognizing certain
exceptions to the asset freeze) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1452]; S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003) (calling for updated reports from States on implementation of
measures and extends Monitoring Group for twelve months); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004) (creating Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 1526]; S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (defining
“terrorism” and establishing a working group to submit recommendations to Security Council on practical measures to deal with terrorist activities) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1566]; S.C.
Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005) (providing definition of “associated with”
and calling for States to use newly created checklist on specific actions taken to implement
measures with regard to individuals and entities added to Consolidated List) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 1617]; S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006) (establishing “focal
point” to receive de-listing requests) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1730]; and S.C. Res. 1735, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1735 (2006) (providing a cover sheet for proposing names for inclusion on
Consolidated List) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1735]. Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1373], is broader than Resolutions
1267 and 1333, authorizing States to designate individuals and entities for economic sanctions who commit terrorist acts or participate in facilitating the commission of terrorist acts,
not limited to al Qaeda and the Taliban. Security Council resolutions relevant to Resolution
1373 include: S.C. Res. 1535, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004) (creating a Counter-
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tries to “freeze without delay” the funds, financial assets and economic resources of Osama bin Laden, members of al Qaeda, the Taliban and persons
and entities associated with them.3 The international economic sanctions
regime established by these resolutions has been characterized as “the sole
vehicle for truly global action against the twin threats of Al-Qaida and the
Taliban.”4
The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention), also recognizing the
need for the world community to work cooperatively to deprive terrorists of
funding, complements the work of the Security Council.5 On June 25, 2002,
the United States ratified the Terrorist Financing Convention.6 Among other
important duties, it requires parties to the Terrorist Financing Convention to
enact domestic legislation to criminalize and punish as a grave offense those
persons who willfully provide or collect funds with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to carry out acts of terrorism.7 The Terrorist
Financing Convention further requires State Parties to hold legal entities,
such as banks, liable for providing financial services to terrorists by the imposition of criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions.8 Most importantly,
the Terrorist Financing Convention imposes a legal obligation on signatories to freeze any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing a
terrorist offense. Article 8(1) provides that “[e]ach State Party shall take
appropriate measures . . . for the identification, detection and freezing or
seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist-related] offences.”9
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1535]; S.C. Res.
1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (creating a working group); S.C. Res. 1624,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Oct. 8, 2005) (prohibiting the incitement to commit terrorist acts)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 1624]; S.C. Res. 1631, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1631 (Oct. 17, 2005) (encouraging better cooperation between U.N. and regional and sub-regional organizations); and
S.C. Res. 1787, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1787 (Dec. 10, 2007) (extending the mandate of the
CTED).
3
See, e.g., id. (S.C. Res. 1390, S.C. Res 1333, and S.C. Res. 1267).
4
U.N. Sec. Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Seventh Report
of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2007/677 (Nov.
29, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml [hereinafter Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team].
5
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-9, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229, [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention].
6
See Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197,
116 Stat. 721 (2002). The U.S. ratified the Terrorist Financing Convention on June 25, 2002.
The Convention is supported by 132 signatories, including the United States.
7
Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 5, art. 4. See also id. art. 2.
8
Id. art. 5(3).
9
Id. art. 8(1).
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The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (FATF), an inter-governmental body responsible for developing and promoting international standards to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing, also acknowledges the importance of international action
to freeze terrorist assets.10 The FATF is comprised of thirty-four member
countries, associate members, FATF-style regional bodies, and several international organizations.11 In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, FATF
adopted Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, including a
provision on terrorist asset freezing. Special Recommendation III: Freezing
and Confiscating Terrorist Assets provides that “[e]ach country should implement measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists,
those who finance terrorist organizations in accordance with the United
Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.”12 Special Recommendation III is intended to implement the obligations imposed on States by Resolution 1267 (1999) and 1373
(2001) to freeze terrorist-related assets. The combination of these three authorities—the U.N. Security Council anti-terrorist financing resolutions, the
Terrorist Financing Convention, and the FATF’s Special Recommendation
III: Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets—makes a compelling case
10
In response to growing concerns over money laundering and the threat posed to the
banking system and financial institutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) was established by the G7 countries at a summit held in Paris in 1989. In
April 1990, the FATF issued a report containing a set of forty recommendations, which set
out a basic legal framework to detect, prevent and suppress money laundering. In October
2001, the FATF expanded its mission to include the prevention of terrorist financing. The
FATF has adopted Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. See Financial
Action Task Force, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 22, 2004),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf [hereinafter Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing]; see also Financial Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations(June 20, 2003), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.pdf [hereinafter Forty Recommendations].
11
The FATF is comprised of thirty-four member countries. India and the Republic of
Korea are observer countries. The associate members include: the Asia/Pacific Group on
Money Laundering (APG); the Grupo de Acción Financiera de Sudamérica (GAFISUD);
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF); and the Council
of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL). The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Eurasian Group, Eastern
and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, and the Intergovernmental Action
Group Against Money Laundering in Africa are FATF-style regional bodies. See Financial
Action Task Force (FATF), FATF Members and Observers, http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en_32250379_32237295_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2009).
12
Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, supra note 10, at 1. Special
Recommendation III further provides: “Each country should also adopt and implement
measures, including legislative ones, which would enable competent authorities to seize and
confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the
financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations.” Id.
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that every country has a legal duty to freeze the funds and curtail the flow of
financial assets to terrorists and their financial supporters.
The successful implementation of an effective terrorist asset freezing regime is critical in combating the financing of terrorism. The U.N.
working group of counter-terrorism experts, established by 2004 Security
Council Resolution 1566, states that “freezing of financial assets is an indispensable tool in curtailing terrorism.”13 It is estimated that approximately
$85 million in terrorist-related funds have been frozen under the international sanctions regime.14 However, the economic sanctions program serves
several other valuable purposes. First, asset freeze acts as a deterrent against
those who otherwise might be willing to finance terrorist activity.15 Second,
persons designated under relevant Security Council resolutions are isolated
from the international financial community. Their funds, financial assets
and economic resources are subject to being frozen anywhere in the world.
Thus, the fear of having their funds and other assets frozen may cause potential donors to reconsider funding terrorist activities. Second, asset freeze
reduces the flow of money and other support to terrorists and makes the
transfer of funds more difficult to effect.16 The economic sanctions program
“terminate[s] terrorist cash flows by shutting down pipelines used to move
terrorist-related assets.”17 Third, an effective financial ban may expose terrorist financing “money trails” that may generate leads to previously unknown terrorist cells and financiers.18 Finally, asset freeze may restrict terrorists from operating extensive terrorist networks, training camps and social programs for funding the families of homicide bombers.19
The U.N. Security Council has been at the forefront of developing
and monitoring the implementation of the anti-terrorism asset freeze pro13

U.N. Sec. Council, Security Council Working Group Established Pursuant to Resolution
1566 (2004), ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/2005/789 (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Report of the Security
Council Working Group Established Pursuant to Resolution 1566].
14
See Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 57 (estimating
that approximately $85 million remains frozen, down from $91.4 million). See also U.N.
Sec. Council, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999),
¶ 47, U.N. Doc. S/2008/324 (May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Eighth Report of the Sanctions
Monitoring Team].
15
See U.N. Security Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Sixth
Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/132 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitoring
team.shtml [hereinafter Sixth Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team].
16
Id.
17
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, United States Designates bin Laden Loyalist
(Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1190.htm.
18
See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Freezing of Terrorist Assets:
International Best Practices, at 2 (Oct. 3, 2003).
19
See Sixth Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 54.
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gram. In addition to adopting numerous resolutions that impose a legal duty
on Member States to freeze terrorist assets, the Security Council has established various committees and expert working groups to monitor the action
taken by States to comply with measures imposed by these resolutions.20
Furthermore, the Council has created a list, known as the “Consolidated
List” or “Sanctions List,” of individuals and entities associated with bin
Laden, al Qaeda, or the Taliban whose assets are required to be frozen by
Member States.21 Each year, however, fewer and fewer names are being
submitted by States for inclusion on the Consolidated List for asset freeze.22
For example, in 2007, only eight names were added to the Sanctions List,
the lowest annual rate ever, continuing a downward trend observable since
2001.23 Equally disturbing, the amount of terrorist assets frozen over the last
several years has stalled. There has been no increase in terrorist assets frozen since 2004.24 In fact, the trend is moving in the opposite direction. At
the end of 2007, approximately $85 million remained frozen under the sanctions regime, down from a previous high of $91.4 million.25 The continuing
viability of the U.N. anti-terrorist financing sanctions program is further
threatened by numerous legal challenges. While the European Court of First
Instance denied claims that the designation process violates fundamental
human rights and due process principles, two cases have been appealed to
the Court of Justice of the European Communities.26 In a January 2008 advisory opinion, an Advocate General for the higher court rejected the lower
court’s conclusion that it lacked competence to review actions implementing Security Council resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter against European Union due process and human rights standards. The
Advocate General found that the European Union regulation implementing
the economic sanctions, EC 881/2002, infringed on the right to be heard, the
right to effective judicial review by an independent tribunal, and the right to
20

S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 2 (creating a committee of members of the Security Council
to oversee implementation of measures imposed by Resolution 1267); S.C. Res. 1526, supra
note 2 (creating the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team).
21
See S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 2, ¶ 8(c).
22
See Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 25.
23
Id. ¶ 25, n. 37 (indicating that, in 2000, “there were seven listings: 2001 – 278 ; 2002 –
54; 2003 – 77; 2004 – 44; 2005 – 32; 2006 – 24). The Consolidated List, however, actually
shows that eight, not five, names were added in 2007. See Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Comm., The Consolidated List of the U.N. Security Council’s Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.p
df [hereinafter Consolidated List].
24
See Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, annex III.
25
Id. ¶ 57.
26
See Joined Cases C-403 & C-415/05, Kadi, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Comm’n, 2005
E.C.R. I.
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property.27 If the Advocate General’s position is adopted by the European
Court of Justice, the regulation used by the twenty-seven Member States of
the European Union to implement the sanctions likely will be held invalid.
Furthermore, U.N. counter-terrorism experts fear that a decision that invalidated the sanctions against so many States also might lead to similar legal
rulings outside of the European Union.28
While the number of U.N. designations is declining and Member
States are reluctant to freeze terrorist-related assets, the threats from al Qaeda and the Taliban remain persistent. According to U.N. counter-terrorism
experts:
Al-Qaida has continued to show its determination to mount major attacks;
it has extended its base of support; its leaders have consolidated their ability to communicate their message and their operational plans, and the Taliban have increased their influence not just in Afghanistan, but in NorthWestern Pakistan as well.29

While much has been written about al Qaeda’s organizational disposition and strength, analysts agree that neither its global influence, nor its
intention to attack the U.S., has declined.30 In 2007, suspected members of
al Qaeda were reported arrested or killed in more than forty countries
around the world, suggesting a high volume of terrorist planning.31 Moreover, in 2007 al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the North Africa
wing of al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for killing dozens of innocent civilians and wounding hundreds more in Algeria.32 These attacks included a
suicide bombing near the U.N. building in Algiers and another attack the
same day against a government office building that killed a total of fortyone people, including seventeen U.N. employees.33
The Taliban remains a serious threat to international peace and security. The terrorist group is resurgent and dominates large areas in southern
Afghanistan. Furthermore, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, also known as the
Taliban Movement of Pakistan, has emerged as a new terrorist threat. The
Taliban Movement of Pakistan, headed by Baitullah Mehsud, operates in
27
Case C–402/05, Kadi v. Council of the E.U. and Commission, ¶¶ 40, 47–55 (Jan. 16,
2008) (Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro) [hereinafter Opinion of the Advocate
General].
28
See Eighth Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 14, ¶ 40.
29
Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 1.
30
Id. ¶ 11.
31
See id.
32
See Hamid Ould Ahmed, Algeria Violence Death Toll Jumps in December, REUTERS
(U.K.), Jan. 3, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKAHM25843620080103.
33
See id.;William Maclean, U.S. Tells Embassy Staff to Raise Algiers Security, REUTERS,
Jan. 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSL2069045420080120.
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the Waziristan region, along the Pakistan border with Afghanistan, where
Western intelligence suggests al Qaeda is regrouping.34 According to one
U.N. report, the Taliban “have enough money to hire foot soldiers and to
buy weapons, including the components for sophisticated improvised explosive devices, and their ability to cross the long and porous border with Pakistan is largely unconstrained.”35 There are currently estimated to be about
3,000 active and as many as 7,000 occasional Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, and the Taliban Movement of Pakistan is estimated to control a fighting
force of 40,000.36 Moreover, al Qaeda and the Taliban appear to be closely
aligned. In a September 2007 video message delivered by Ayman alZawahiri, al Qaeda’s second-in-command, he referred to Mullah Omar, the
head of the Taliban, as the supreme leader.37 Further, the Taliban appears to
have adopted some of al Qaeda’s terrorist tactics. In January 2008, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed seven people,
including an American, at a luxury hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan, where the
Norwegian foreign minister was staying.38 Finally, Baitullah Mehsud, the
leader of the Taliban Movement in Pakistan, is suspected of involvement in
the tragic assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
in December 2007.39
The Security Council’s international asset freeze program has
reached a critical juncture. Senior counter-terrorism officials are less enthusiastic about the economic sanctions regime than ever before and Member
States are reluctant to submit names for inclusion on the Consolidated
List.40 Terrorist-related assets are no longer being frozen.41 As a result, al
Qaeda and the Taliban retain ample funding to sustain their operations and

34
See Kathy Gannon, New Taliban Chief Entering Limelight, ABC NEWS, Jan. 26, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=4195091.
35
Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 17.
36
Id.; Gannon, supra note 34.
37
Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 19.
38
Hamid Shalizi, Suicide Attack on Afghan Luxury Hotel Kills Seven, REUTERS, Jan. 14,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article,sorldNews/idUSISL3746220080115 (“Norway
has about 500 soldiers in Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led international force sent there
after U.S. and Afgan forces ousted the Taliban government in 2001.”).
39
Gannon, supra note 34; CIA Links al Qaeda, Allies to Bhutto Attack, REUTERS, Jan. 18,
2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia-31464020080118.
40
See Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶¶ 8, 25.
41
Id. ¶¶ 57–58, n. 55. See also Sixth Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note
15, ¶ 3 (“[F]ew names have been added to the Consolidated List of individuals, groups and
entities subject to the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions measures, and States have not reported
much action against those who are already on it.”) (citation omitted).
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finance deadly terrorist attacks.42 Based on every objective measurement,
the international economic sanctions program appears to be failing. Unless
significant measures are taken to hold Member States accountable for their
failures to comply with their duties to freeze terrorist-related assets “without
delay,” the anti-terrorist financing sanctions regime will cease to be relevant
in the struggle against global terrorism.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
REGIME
A.

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333

The international assets freeze program has its origins in three important U.N. Security Council resolutions: 1267, 1333, and 1373. While the
Security Council has adopted a number of successor resolutions intended to
strengthen the mandated of these resolutions (as least thirteen in total), these
three resolutions constitute the foundation for the international legal framework to freeze terrorist-related assets.43 In October 1998, the Security
Council decided that the threat posed by al Qaeda required an international
response. The Taliban had provided al Qaeda a safe haven, where the terror
group was able to plan, supervise, and execute terrorist attacks, including
those against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, in August 1998. Accustomed to dealing with State actors, the
Council decided to confront al Qaeda by imposing sanctions on the Taliban,
who operated as the de facto government in Afghanistan. The Security
Council adopted Resolution 1267, which imposed various obligations on
Member States, including the duty to freeze funds and other financial resources owned or operated by the Taliban.44 Paragraph 4(b) requires countries to “[f]reeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly
by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban.”45 The resolution further created a committee, consisting of members
42
See Sixth Report of the Sanctions Monitoring, supra note 15, ¶ 6 (“[I]t seems clear that
the [Taliban] movement has no current shortage of money, either to hire fighters or to provide them with weapons.”) (citation omitted).
43
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that the sanctions regime established
by Resolutions 1267 and 1333 has been modified and strengthened by subsequent resolutions, including Resolutions 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617
(2005), 1730 (2006), and 1735 (2006)).
44
See S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 2. Resolution 1267 also imposed a ban on air travel to
and from territory controlled by the Taliban, imposed a weapons ban, directed the Taliban to
cease providing al Qaeda a safe haven, and ordered that Osama bin Laden be immediately
turned over to appropriate authorities for prosecution in connection with the African embassy
bombings. Id.
45
Id. ¶ 4(b).
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of the Security Council, to monitor actions taken by States to implement the
measures imposed by the resolution (Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Committee or 1267 Committee).46
The Taliban failed to comply with the Security Council’s mandates,
and terrorist attacks by al Qaeda members continued. On October 12, 2000,
a small boat filled with explosives was detonated against the USS Cole,
docked in Aden, Yemen. The blast killed seventeen American sailors and
wounded at least forty others. Moreover, members of al Qaeda continued to
operate a network of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, responsible for
training as many as 10,000 terrorists. In response to the attack on the USS
Cole and other terrorist activities by al Qaeda, in December 2000 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1333, which went beyond imposing sanctions on State actors such as the Taliban. Resolution 1333 imposed measures on individuals and non-State entities, mandating a freeze on the financial assets of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and individuals and entities associated with them.47 In essence, through Resolution 1333, the Security Council sought to isolate bin Laden, al Qaeda, and their associates from the international community, including sympathetic financial donors.
Paragraph 8(c) of Resolution 1333 requires the Sanctions Committee created by Resolution 1267 “to [establish and maintain] an updated list,
based on information provided by States and regional organizations, of the
individuals and entities designated as being associated with Usama bin Laden, including those in the Al-Qaida organization.”48 Member States are
encouraged to submit information to the members of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee on individuals and entities associated with bin
Laden and al Qaeda for designation and placement on the list by the Committee. After inclusion on that list, Member States are obliged to “freeze
without delay” the “funds and other financial assets” of those individuals
and entities.49 The list, referred to as the “Consolidated List,” includes persons and entities associated with the Taliban, as well as bin Laden and al
Qaeda.50 Unfortunately, the Security Council sanctions aimed at al Qaeda
46
Id. ¶ 6. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee is responsible for overseeing
implementation by States of the sanctions measures (assets freeze, travel and arms embargo)
imposed by the Security Council on individuals and entities belonging to or associated with
the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and al Qaeda. See S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 2.
47
S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5(a), 8(b), 8(c), 11 (noting regulations concerning
weapons bans, closures of Arian Afghan Airlines offices in Member States, asset freezes, and
travel bans).
48
Id. ¶ 8(c).
49
Id.
50
See Sec. Council Fact Sheet on Listing, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sh
eet_listing.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Fact Sheet on Listing]. See also S.C.
Res. 1390, supra note 2 (expanding the sanctions imposed under Resolutions 1267 and 1333
beyond the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to terrorist groups or individuals generally); see
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and the Taliban achieved less than was expected. Few names were placed
on the Consolidated List.51 However, the Security Council’s determination
to deal with international terrorism, including its funding, was strengthened
by the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
B.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.N. Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, which imposes several important duties on Member States to combat the threat of global terrorism.52
As a result of this resolution, States are required to prevent the movement of
terrorists by effective border controls and regulations on the issuance of
travel documents (travel ban), to prevent the supply of weapons to terrorists
(arms embargo), to deny safe haven to those who plan, support or commit
terrorist acts (safe haven ban), and to afford States the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal terrorism investigations (mutual assistance).53 Resolution 1373 further imposes certain obligations on Member
States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism. First, States are
required to criminalize the willful provision or collection of terrorist-related
funds.54 To comply with this provision, States must enact domestic legislation, if necessary, to make it a crime to collect or provide funds to terrorists.55 Second, States must ensure that any person who participates in financing terrorist acts is prosecuted and brought to justice.56 Third, States
must prohibit persons and entities from making financial assets, economic
resources, and financial services available to persons who commit or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts.57 Finally, Resolution 1373 authorizes
also Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the E.U., 2005 E.C.R. II–34533, ¶ 128, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62001A0306:EN:HTML
(“[A]lthough [Resolution 1390] still expressly refers to the Taliban, the resolution is no
longer aimed at their fallen regime, but rather directly at Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida
network and the persons and entities associated with them.”).
51
See Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 25 n. 37 (noting
that there were only seven listings in 2000).
52
See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2.
53
See id. ¶¶ 2(a), (c), (f), (g). See also ALISTAIR MILLAR & ERIC ROSAND, ALLIED AGAINST
TERRORISM 16 (2006).
54
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, ¶ 1(b).
55
The duty to establish the financing of terrorism as a criminal offense under a State’s
domestic legislation is further imposed as a term of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. See Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note
5, art. 4. The U.S. is a signatory to the Terrorist Financing Convention, which was ratified by
the U.S. Senate on June 25, 2002. See Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat. 721 (2002).
56
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, ¶ 2(e).
57
Id. ¶ 1(d).
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States to “[f]reeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources” of terrorists, those who finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations around the world.58
The assets freeze provision is particularly broad in scope and coverage. Paragraph 1(c) of Resolution 1373 requires all countries to “freeze
without delay” the funds and other financial assets, or economic resources
of: (1) persons who commit, or attempt to commit, participate in, or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; (2) “entities owned or controlled by
such persons;” (3) “persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the directions of, such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated
from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons;”
and (4) associated persons and entities.59 States are required to freeze not
only the “funds and other financial assets” of terrorists and their associates,
but also their “economic resources.”60 In addition to freezing the financial
assets of designated persons and entities, paragraph 1(c) requires States to
freeze their non-monetary assets, such as real estate, vehicles, aircraft, ships,
equipment, precious stones, and other personal property.61 More importantly, Resolution 1373 is not limited to freezing the funds and assets owned or
controlled by al Qaeda, bin Laden, the Taliban, and individuals and entities
associated with them, but also reaches the financial resources of any person
or entity involved in the commission of terrorist acts. For example, Resolution 1373 authorizes States to freeze the assets of Hamas,62 Hizballah,63 the
58

Id. ¶ 1(c).
Id. Resolution 1617 defines the acts or activities indicating that an individual or entity is
“associated with” al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, or the Taliban to include:
· participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of
acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in
support of;
· supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;
· recruiting for; or
· otherwise supporting acts or activities of;
Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group of
derivative thereof.
S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 2, ¶ 2.
60
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, ¶ 1(c).
61
See Seventh Report of the Sanction Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 84, annex I, n. 10.
It should be noted that Resolution 1735 (2006) expanded the property subject to asset freeze
under the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions to include “funds and other financial assets or
economic resources.” S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, ¶ 1(a) (emphasis added).
62
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Shutting Down the Terrorist Financial Network (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/29.
pdf (noting that HAMAS was designated as a terrorist organization in 1995 pursuant to Executive Order 12947 and was added to the list of terrorist organizations subject to the asset
freeze in 1996 under Executive Order 13224).
59
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE),64 the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC),65 and other terrorist groups not controlled by
al Qaeda, bin Laden, and the Taliban.
There are two other significant differences between Resolutions
1267 and 1333 and Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373 does not create a list
of terrorist organizations, entities, or individuals subject to asset freeze.
While States are obliged to freeze the funds, financial assets, and other economic resources of persons involved in the commission of terrorist acts,
Resolution 1373 does not require that their names be placed on a U.N.administered list.66 The Consolidated List created by Resolutions 1267 and
1333, targeting al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and individuals
and entities associated with them, is the only such terrorist financing list.
Additionally, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) created by
Resolution 1373 is not a sanctions body. It is not responsible for designating
individuals and entities for asset freeze. Under Resolution 1373, a decision
to freeze assets takes place on two levels.67 Initially, a competent national
authority decides whether certain assets should be frozen because the person
or entity falls within the mandate of paragraph 1(c) of the resolution
(“freeze without delay”).68 After the initial evaluation, other States must
decide, in the exercise of their discretion, whether to adopt the sanction and
impose an asset freeze on the party concerned. Freezing the assets of such
person or entity is not mandated by the CTC.

63

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Hizballah’s Construction Arm (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp271.htm (noting that
Hizballah was designated a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) in 1995, a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997, and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2001
under Executive Order 13224).
64
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Targets Charity Covertly Supporting Violence in Sri Lanka (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp683.ht
m (noting Department of State designated LTTE an FTO in 1997 and an SDGT in 2001.
LTTE is also listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union and Canada).
65
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Targets 15 Leaders of Colombian
Narco-Terrorist Group (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases
/hp661.htm (noting that FARC was named an FTO by the Secretary of State in October 1997
and a SDGT pursuant to Executive Order 13224 in November 2001).
66
See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2.
67
See Case T-47/03, Sison v. Council of the E.U., 2007 E.C.R. ¶¶ 164–67 (discussing the
process for asset freezes under Resolution 1373).
68
See id.; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, ¶ 1(c).
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The Committee established by Resolution 1267, the Al-Qaida and
Taliban Sanctions Committee, is responsible for overseeing States’ implementation of the measures (assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo)
imposed by the Security Council to combat the terrorist threat posed by
Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and persons and entities associated
with them. The Committee’s mandate was originally limited to the Taliban,
but was extended to include al Qaeda, bin Laden, and their associates by
Resolutions 1333 and 1390.69 The Committee maintains a list of individuals
and entities for this purpose, the Consolidated List. To prevent and suppress
the financing of terrorism, States are obliged to freeze the assets of individuals and entities on the Consolidated List.70 The mandate of the Committee
further includes regularly updating the List, examining reports submitted by
Member States documenting their compliance with Resolutions 1267 and
1333 and other related resolutions, considering requests for de-listing or
removal from the List, and submitting periodic reports to the Security
Council.71
2.

Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

In 2004, to further strengthen the mandate of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, the Security Council established an eightperson Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (Monitoring
Team).72 The Monitoring Team, which operates under the direction of the
Sanctions Committee, was initially mandated to monitor and make recommendations on implementation of the measures imposed by Resolutions
1267, 1333 and 1390. The Monitoring Team further was tasked with submitting three comprehensive reports to the Sanctions Committee on implementation by States of the measures imposed by the relevant Security
Council resolutions, including recommendations for improved implementation and possible new measures.73 Resolutions 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006),

69

See S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 2; see also S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 2.
S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 2, ¶ 8(c).
71
See U.N. Sec. Council, Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Guidelines of the
Committee for the Conduct of its Work (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/sc/co
mmittees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf (describing a more comprehensive list of the 1267
Committee’s mandate) [hereinafter Guidelines of the Committee].
72
S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6–7.
73
Id. ¶ 8.
70
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and 1822 (2008) extended the mandate of the Monitoring Team.74 To date,
the Monitoring Team has submitted eight reports to the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, and has been tasked with submitting two additional reports by the end of July 2009.75 The Monitoring Team has been
involved in other activities intended to enhance the effectiveness of the antiterrorism economic sanctions measures, including visiting Member States,
participating in national, sub-regional, regional, and international conferences, and meeting with intelligence and security services and representatives of financial institutions.76
3.

Resolution 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee

To monitor implementation of the duties imposed on Member
States by Resolution 1373, the Security Council established the CTC, comprised of all fifteen members of the Council, to be assisted by appropriate
experts.77 One of the CTC’s most important responsibilities is to help States
obtain the technical assistance they need to implement the measures imposed by Resolution 1373.78 More specifically, the CTC coordinates and
facilitates the delivery of training and technical assistance to States to prevent the financing of terrorism. The CTC’s mandate also includes strengthening contacts and coordination both with the U.N. system of organizations and among international, regional, sub-regional and intergovernmental organizations, and identifying and promoting best practices in
all key areas of Resolution 1373.79 Over time, the CTC’s responsibilities
have expanded to include reviewing hundreds of reports submitted by
Member States on actions taken to implement Resolution 1373.80 Finally, in
2005, Resolution 1624 broadened the CTC’s mandate to include working
74

S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 2, ¶ 19; S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 2, ¶ 32. On June 20,
2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1822, extending the mandate of the Monitoring Team until the end of 2010. S.C. Res. 1822, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (2008) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1822].
75
The last report of the Monitoring Team was submitted on May 14, 2008. See Eighth
Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 14. See also S.C. Res. 1822, supra
note 74, annex I(a) (requiring the Monitoring Team to submit two additional reports to the
Sanctions Committee, one by February 28, 2009, and the second by July 31, 2009).
76
Id. annex I(p)–(r), (u).
77
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, ¶ 6.
78
See U.N. Sec. Council, Counter-Terrorism Comm. Report of the Counter-Terrorism
Comm. to the Sec. Council, ¶¶ 12–14, U.N. Doc. S/2007/675 (Nov. 20, 2007).
79
Id. ¶ 2.
80
See MILLAR & ROSAND, supra note 53, at 16–17; see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver CounterTerrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad 40 (2005),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0619.pdf.
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with States to implement measures to prohibit and prevent incitement to
commit acts of terrorism.81
4.

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

Initially, consultants hired by the U.N. Secretariat, hired on shortterm contracts, performed the CTC’s work. Realizing the need for a more
permanent and professional staff, in March 2004 the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1535, creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), comprised of thirty-five counter-terrorism experts and support staff.82 The Security Council adopted Resolution 1805
extending the CTED’s mandate until the end of 2010.83 The CTED consists
of an Assessment and Technical Assistance Office (ATAO) and the Information and Administrative Office (IAO).84 The ATAO is composed of
twenty counter-terrorism experts and is responsible for evaluating the technical assistance needs of States to assist them in implementing measures
imposed by Resolution 1373.85 The IAO is in charge of handling the administrative needs of the CTC, including overseeing personnel and financial
matters.86
The CTED’s mandate includes providing the CTC with expert advice on all areas covered by Resolution 1373, reviewing Member States’
reports on their implementation of their obligations, visiting countries to
verify their reports, facilitating technical assistance to countries to enhance
their asset freeze regime, and coordinating with other U.N. counterterrorism bodies.87 The CTED’s mandate also includes monitoring Member
States’ implementation of Security Council Resolution 1624, condemning
81

See S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5–6.
S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 2, ¶ 2. See Mike Smith, Executive Director of the CTED,
Sec. Council Counter-Terrorism Comm., Presentation to John Jay College of Criminal Justice (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/pdf/JohnJayCollegespeech.pdf
[hereinafter Presentation to John Jay College of Criminal Justice].
83
S.C. Res. 1805, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1805 (2008).
84
The CTED has been fully staffed since September 2005 and was declared fully operational in December 2005. See MILLAR & ROSAND, supra note 53, at 17; see also Sec. Council: Counter-Terrorism Comm., http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/page1.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
85
U.N. Sec. Council, Organizational Plan for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate, ¶¶ 14–16, U.N. Doc. S/2004/642 (Aug. 12, 2004). The ATAO has been divided
into three “geographical clusters” to enable experts to specialize in particular regions of the
world. Briefing to Members States by the Executive Director (Apr. 29, 2008),
http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/pdf/ms_informalbriefing_29apr.pdf.
86
See U.N. Sec. Council, U.N. Counter-Terrorism Comm. Executive Directorate, Organizational Plan for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, ¶¶ 17–18, U.N.
Doc. S/2004/642 (Aug. 12, 2004).
87
See Presentation to John Jay College of Criminal Justice, supra note 82.
82
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incitement to commit acts of terrorism.88 Finally, the CTED works closely
and coordinates its activities with the Monitoring Team created to enhance
the work of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.
5.

Resolution 1566 Working Group

Following the terrorist incident involving the seizure of approximately 1,200 hostages and the deaths of hundreds of children at a school in
Beslan, Russia, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1566 in October
2004.89 In addition to strongly condemning acts of terrorism, especially the
killing of innocent children, Resolution 1566 established a working group
consisting of all members of the Security Council. The Working Group was
tasked with submitting recommendations to the Council on “practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the AlQaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee.”90 The Working Group further was
directed to look into the possibility of establishing an international fund to
compensate the victims of terrorist acts.91 The CTC is now aided by two
administrative bodies created by the Security Council, the CTED and the
1566 Working Group, in evaluating the implementation of Resolution 1373.
III. THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESIGNATION PROCESS
A.

Consolidated List

The Consolidated List has been characterized as the “cornerstone”
of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime.92 Designation pursuant to
Resolutions 1267 and 1333 involves a two-step process: (1) Member States
submit the names of persons and entities for inclusion on the Consolidated
List to the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee; and (2) the Committee reviews the submissions and makes a final determination on whether to
add the names to the List. Initially, a competent national authority decides
whether the concerned party falls within coverage of the relevant resolutions and therefore should be placed on the Consolidated List.93 The Sanc88
89

S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 2, ¶ 6.

S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 2.
Id. ¶ 9.
91
Id. ¶ 10. As of January 2008, the 1566 Working Group has only published one report
proposing some general practical measures to prevent terrorist financing. See Report of the
Security Council Working Group Established Pursuant to Resolution 1566, supra note 13.
92
U.N. Sec. Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Fifth Report of
the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. S/2006/750 (Sept.
20, 2006) [hereinafter Fifth Report of the Monitoring Team].
93
The term “competent authority” is not defined under any of the relevant U.N. Security
Council Resolutions. In essence, the Security Council has deferred to the States, permitting
90

36

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:19

tions Committee then must decide whether to include the person on the List,
on the basis of evidence submitted by the Member State to justify the proposed designation.94
By the end of 2007, more than four hundred and eighty names had
been placed on the Consolidated List, the vast majority of which were submitted by the United States shortly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.95 The list is divided into five sections: the first for individuals
belonging to or associated with the Taliban (one hundred and forty-two individuals); the second for entities belonging to or associated with the Taliban (none); the third for individuals belonging to or associated with the al
Qaeda organization (two hundred and twenty-five individuals); the fourth
for entities belonging to or associated with al Qaeda (one hundred and
twelve entities); and the fifth for individuals and entities that have been removed from the list pursuant to a decision by the Al-Qaida and Taliban
Sanctions Committee (eleven individuals and twenty-four entities).96
B.

Submission of Names by Member States

Member States play a crucial role in the designation process. All
names on the Consolidated List have been submitted to the Sanctions
Committee by Member States. States are responsible for both the accuracy
and sufficiency of the information provided to the Committee. Thus, the
accuracy of the List depends on the accuracy of the information included in
the State submissions. When proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the Consolidated List, States are required to use the Cover Sheet for
Member States Submission to the Committee, attached as an annex to the
Guidelines to the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work (Committee
Guidelines). Security Council Resolution 1735 created the cover sheet,
which was then attached as an annex to the Resolution, and was intended to
simplify the designation process and enhance the quality of the identifier
information submitted with State proposals for designation.97 The cover
sheet details the type of identifier information that should be included in the
listing proposal. Specific identifier information is needed to enable the accurate identification of individuals and entities by the competent authorities
them to designate such person consistent with their domestic laws and administrative or
judicial process.
94
See Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 12(c) (explaining that the proposed
designations are submitted to the Committee through the Member States’ Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York).
95
See Seventh Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 4; MILLAR &
ROSAND, supra note 53, at 19, 20.
96
See Consolidated List, supra note 23 (noting the most recent numbers on the Consolidated List).
97
S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 2, ¶¶ 7–8.
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that are required to implement the sanctions measures against such persons
and entities. Use of the cover sheet enhances clarity, uniformity and consistency with regard to names submitted by Member States for inclusion on the
List.
For individuals, States are required to identify: “family
name/surname, given names, other relevant names, date of birth, place of
birth, nationality/citizenship, gender, aliases, employment/occupation, residence, passport or travel document and national identification number, current and previous addresses, website addresses, and current location.”98
States are further encouraged to submit known aliases used by the individual proposed for designation, and whether the alias is considered a “good
quality” or “low quality” alias.99 For groups, the following identified information should be provided, including: “name, acronyms, address, headquarters, subsidiaries, affiliates, fronts, nature of business or activity, leadership,
tax or other identification number and other names by which it is known or
was formerly known, and website addresses.”100 If the submissions are
found to be inadequate, however, the Committee retains the discretion to
request additional identifier information or to refuse to approve the designation until additional information is provided. While less than perfect, the
quality of the identifier information included in Member State submissions
generally has improved over time through enhanced listing procedures
adopted by the Committee.
C.

Statement of the Case

The Guidelines of the Committee further require States to provide a
statement of the case with each submission that establishes the justification
for the listing in accordance with the relevant resolutions. The statement of
the case should provide as much detail as possible to support a decision for
listing, including:
(1) specific findings demonstrating the association or activities alleged;

98

Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 6(e).
See Consolidated List, supra note 23. The term “alias” refers to a name, other than the
person’s true birth name, that is used by the person placed on the Consolidated List. The
State submitting the name for placement on the Consolidated List determines the quality of
the alias. For example, if the State submitting the name has strong evidence that the designee
has used a particular false name in the past, such alias would be characterized as a “good
quality alias.” However, if the State merely suspects that the designee has used a particular
false name, that alias would be characterized as a “low quality alias.” Ultimately, the submission of alias information is merely an attempt to assist States in identifying the correct person
for asset freeze.
100
Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 6(e).
99
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(2) the nature of the supporting evidence (e.g., intelligence, law enforcement, judicial, media, admissions by subject, etc.);
(3) supporting evidence or documents that can be supplied . . .
[and];
(4) the details of any connection with a currently listed individual or
entity.101
Before a State proposes a name for addition to the Consolidated
List, it is encouraged to contact the State of residence or citizenship of the
individual or entity concerned to obtain any possible additional information
to support the designation.102 States also are required to indicate to the
Committee what portions of the statement of the case may be released to the
public or other Member States.103
D.

Standard of Proof

A criminal charge or conviction is not required for an individual’s
inclusion on the Consolidated List. According to the Security Council, asset
freeze is a preventive measure intended to stop the flow of funds to terrorists, rather than to punish the owner for the commission of a crime.104 The
legal standard for asset freeze is whether there are “reasonable grounds” or
a “reasonable basis” to believe that such funds or other assets could be used
to finance terrorist activity, not the criminal justice standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.105 In Yusuf v. Council of the E.U, the Court of
First Instance stated that “freezing of funds is a precautionary measure
which, unlike confiscation, does not affect the very substance of the right of
the persons concerned to property in their financial assets but only the use
thereof.”106 This point was reiterated in the Third Report of the Sanctions
Monitoring Team, which stated that although many of those on the List
have been convicted of terrorist offences, and others indicted or criminally
charged, the List is not a criminal list. The U.N. Report states: “[T]he sanctions do not impose a criminal punishment or procedure such as detention,
101

Id. ¶ 6(d).
Id. ¶ 6(c).
103
Id. ¶ 6(d).
104
See S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 74 (stating that the asset freeze measures are “preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law”); Financial Action Task Force, The Interpretative Notes to the Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing, Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III: Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets, ¶ 2 (Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/53/32/34262136.pdf (stating that the intent of freezing terrorist-related
assets is preventative, not punitive) [hereinafter Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III].
105
See Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III, supra note 104, ¶¶ 2, 6.
106
Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the E.U., 2005 ECR II-3533, ¶ 299.
102
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arrest or extradition, but instead supply administrative measures such as
freezing assets.”107
Many of the individuals on the Consolidated List are members of al
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.108 Entities on the List associated with
the al Qaeda organization read like a “Who’s Who” of Islamist terrorist
organizations. These extremist terror groups include: the Abu Sayyaf
Group; Al-Itihadd Al-Islamiya; al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; AlJihad/Egyptian Islamic Movement; Ansar Al-Islam; Armed Islamic Group;
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement; Islamic Army of Aden; Islamic International Brigade; Islamic Jihad Group; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan;
Jaish-i-Mohammed; Jama’at al-Tawid Wa’al-Jihad; Jemaah Islamiyah;
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi; Libyan Islamic Fighting Group;
Moroccan Islamic Combat Group; and the Tunisian Combatant Group.109
Additionally, a number of Islamic charities suspected of funding al Qaeda
have been placed on the List, including over fourteen branches of AlHaramain, a charity based in Saudi Arabia.110
E.

Joint Designations

In the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Member States submitted joint designations to the Al-Qaida and Taliban
Sanctions Committee. For example, in March 2002, the United States “participated in its first joint designation of a terrorist supporter. The United
States and Saudi Arabia jointly designated the Somalia and BosniaHerzegovina offices of Al-Haramain, a Saudi-based [non-governmental
107

U.N. Sec. Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Third Report of
the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. S/2005/572 (Sept.
9, 2005).
108
The Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team provides a criminal profile of the individuals
on the List:
[A]bout two thirds of the individuals on the Al-Qaida list have been charged with a
criminal offence; about 40 percent have been convicted and sentenced; the cases
against about 20 percent remain pending; and less than five percent have been acquitted. More than half of the total were facing charges or had been convicted
(even if in absentia) before they were put on the List. About half have been arrested at some point, two thirds of who were arrested before their listing. No more
than 25 percent of the individuals on the Al-Qaida list can be presumed to be alive,
not in custody and never arrested, charged or convicted of a criminal offence.
Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 33.
109
See Consolidated List, supra note 23. Most of these organizations have been designated
by the U.S. State Department as foreign terrorist organizations. See U.S. Dep’t of State,
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Report on Terrorism 236–80 (Apr.
30, 2007), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm.
110
See Consolidated List, supra note 23.
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organization].”111 These charities were linked to al Qaeda and their names
were forwarded to the Sanctions Committee for inclusion on the Consolidated List. In April 2002, the United States and the other G7 members jointly designated nine individuals and one organization.112 All of these parties
were European-based al Qaeda organizers and terrorist financiers.113 In August 2002, the United States and Italy jointly designated eleven individuals
and fourteen entities linked to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, and
al Qaeda-linked terrorist group operating in Algeria.114 The group has since
changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and strengthened its
affiliation with al Qaeda. In September 2002, the United States and Saudi
Arabia jointly referred to the Sanctions Committee Wa’el Hamza Julaidan,
an alleged associate of Osama bin Laden and a supporter of al Qaeda.115
Finally, in October 2002, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia, where a mini-van loaded with explosives was detonated in front of two
nightclubs, killing 202 people and injuring 300 more, the United States,
Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and several other countries
designated Jemaah Islamiyah, an al Qaeda-affiliated group operating in
Southeast Asia.116 A few days later, the Sanctions Committee added Jemaah
Islamiya to its terror list.117
F.

Review and Final Determination by the Sanctions Committee

The Sanctions Committee is required to expeditiously consider requests to place names on the Consolidated List. Once a submission is received, it is circulated to all fifteen Committee members, who have five
working days to raise any objection.118 If no one objects, the listing is approved.119 However, a Committee member may request additional time to
111

Jimmy Gurulé, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee (Oct. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/po3518.htm [hereinafter Testimony
before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee].
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Dep’t Statement on the Designation of Wa’el Hamza Julaidan (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/
releases/po3397.htm.
116
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Statement by Secretary Paul O’Neill on
Designation of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/pre
ss/releases/po3569.htm.
117
See Press Release, United Nations, 1267 Committee Adds Name of an Entity to its List,
U.N. Doc. SC/7548 (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/S
C7548.doc.htm.
118
See Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 4(b).
119
Id.
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consider the submission, in which case a decision is suspended until the
member is ready to proceed. Such a “hold” may occur when a member believes more information is needed to justify the listing, the submission lacks
specific identifier information to accurately identify the subject, or more
time is needed to evaluate the listing.120 In practice, the Committee does not
reach a decision on submissions within the five-day no-objection period.
Since the beginning of 2005, more time has often been required. In fact, it is
not uncommon for a decision on a submission to take weeks.121
The decision to approve a submission is made by consensus of the
Committee’s members.122 As previously noted, because inclusion on the
List is not intended as punishment for a crime, the criminal standard of
proof does not apply. Instead, the decision to list is measured against a lower standard of “reasonable grounds” or “reasonable basis” to believe that
funds or other assets are terrorist-related.123
Once a proposed designation is approved, the Committee issues an
announcement on its website and updates the Consolidated List. All U.N.
Member States are thereafter required to “freeze without delay” any assets
owned or controlled by the designated party.124 This requires Member States
to notify appropriate authorities, agencies and private sector offices within
their respective jurisdictions so that action can be taken to implement the
freeze order “without delay,” which ideally means with a few hours of a
designation by the Committee. Prompt action is necessary “to prevent the
flight or dissipation of terrorist-linked funds or other assets, and . . . to interdict and disrupt their flow swiftly.”125 Any delay between a listing becoming public and measures being taken by Member States affords the
listed party an opportunity to move the assets beyond the reach of the sanctions.126 Additionally, the duty to freeze the assets of persons and groups on
120
121
122
123
124

See Sixth Report of the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 44.
Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 4(a).
Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III, supra note 104, ¶¶ 2, 6.
Interpretive Note to Special Recommendation III, supra note 104, ¶ 6.
The term freeze means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of funds or other assets on the basis of, and for the duration of the validity of,
an action initiated by a competent authority or a court under a freezing mechanism.
The frozen funds or other assets remain the property of the person(s) or entity(ies)
that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time of the freezing
and may continue to be administered by the financial institution or other arrangements designated by such person(s) or entity(ies) prior to the initiation of an action
under a freezing mechanism.

Id. ¶ 7(a).
125
Id. ¶ 7(i).
126
See Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 62.
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the List is an ongoing obligation. For example, when opening a new account, banks should check the name of the new customer against the names
on the Consolidated List. The Committee is further responsible for updating
the List.
A checklist was introduced by Security Council Resolution 1617 to
remind Member States of the action that should be taken with regard to new
listings.127 States are required to answer “yes” or “no” on several questions,
including whether the Member State has notified financial institutions of the
designation and frozen any assets.128 Member States are encouraged to
submit any additional information on listed individuals and entities that
would improve the existing information on the Consolidated List.129
States were further required by Resolution 1617 to submit a checklist by March 1, 2006, to the Committee on any individuals and entities
placed on the Consolidated List prior to the Resolution.130 Many States,
however, have been unwilling to submit a checklist to the Committee. In the
Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team submitted to the Sanctions Committee in November 2007, the Team acknowledged the lack of cooperation:
There are . . . 135 States which had not submitted a checklist 19 months
after the reporting date (1 March 2006). [T]he checklists have only provided limited information from 57 States on the 24 names added to the List
between 29 July 2005 and 31 January 2006, and nothing concerning the
443 names that were already there, or the 23 names added since February
2006.131

Needless to say, the unwillingness of Member States to comply
with measures taken by the Security Council to enhance implementation of
Resolutions 1267 and 1333 seriously undermines the effectiveness of the
financial embargo imposed by the Security Council on members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated entities, intended to prevent the commission
of terrorist attacks.
G.

De-Listing Process

A person whose name is added to the Consolidated List is afforded
an opportunity to present his case to the Sanctions Committee for review.
The Committee’s Guidelines authorize de-listing or removing names from
127

S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 2, ¶ 10. The checklist is available on the Sanction Committee’s website at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/checklist.pdf.
128
See S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 2, annex II.
129
See Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 7.
130
S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 2, ¶ 10.
131
Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 143; see also Fifth Report of
the Sanctions Monitoring Team, supra note 92, ¶ 34 (noting States’ reluctance to report by
submitting checklists to the Committee).
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the Consolidated List.132 Individuals, groups or entities may submit a petition to consider their cases for de-listing through their States of residence or
citizenship.133 Alternatively, a party can submit a request for de-listing
through an administrative “focal point” established within the Security
Council Subsidiary Organ Branch to receive de-listing requests.134 The focal
point would forward the de-listing request for information and comment to
the designating State and the petitioner’s State of residence or citizenship to
determine whether that state or states support or oppose the petition for delisting.135 The views of the concerned States are then forwarded to the Sanctions Committee for review and a decision on the petition for de-listing.
This process is outlined in paragraph 8 of the Committee’s Guidelines.136
If the petitioner submits the de-listing request to the State of residence or citizenship, the State should review all relevant information.137 If
the petitioned State wishes to pursue a de-listing request, it should then seek
to persuade the designating State to submit jointly or separately a request
for de-listing to the Committee.138 The petitioned State may, however, without an accompanying request from the designating State, submit a request
for de-listing to the Sanctions Committee.139 The Committee is required to
reach a decision by consensus. However, if consensus cannot be reached,
the matter may be submitted to the Security Council for final resolution.140
A name may be removed from the Consolidated List for two reasons: (1) “the individual or entity was placed on the Consolidated List due
to a mistake of identity;” or (2) the “individual or entity no longer meets the
criteria set out in the relevant resolutions.”141 In deciding whether to approve the petition for de-listing, the Committee members may consider
whether the individual or entity has severed ties with al Qaeda, the Taliban,
and their supporters.142 While de-listing requests are not liberally granted,

132

See Sec. Council Comm. Fact Sheet on De-Listing, available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sheet_delisting.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet on De-Listing].
133
See Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 8(a).
134
S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 2.
135
Id. ¶ 5.
136
Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 8. See also S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 2,
¶ 6.
137
See Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 8(b).
138
See id. ¶ 8(d).
139
Id.
140
Id. ¶ 8(f).
141
S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 2, ¶ 14.
142
Id.
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eleven individuals and twenty-four entities have been removed from the
Consolidated List.143
H.

Humanitarian Exception

Resolution 1452 recognizes a humanitarian exception to assets frozen pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1333, creating a broad exception for
assets necessary to cover basic living expenses such as food, rent, mortgage,
medicines and medical treatment, taxes, public utilities, insurance premiums, and for reasonable professional fees, including legal fees.144 In Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, the European Court of First Instance
interpreted the humanitarian exception to prohibit asset freeze of “any kind
of funds or economic resources . . . for the carrying on of employed or selfemployed professional activities and the funds received or receivable in
connection with such activity.”145 More specifically, the Court found that
granting the applicant a taxi-driver’s license, permitting him to use his car
for business purposes, and allowing him to keep the receipts produced by
working as a taxi-driver could be the object of derogation from the freezing
of applicant’s funds and economic resources under Resolution 1452.146
The resolution also authorizes access to frozen assets to pay “extraordinary expenses.”147 However, what constitutes an “extraordinary expense” is not defined or explained in the resolution and therefore is subject
to liberal interpretation. Under the Committee’s Guidelines, Member States
are required to notify the Committee of the intention to authorize access to
frozen funds or assets needed to cover basis or extraordinary expenses. After receiving notice, the Committee has three working days to inform the
submitting State of the Committee’s position.148 Once again, the Committee’s decision is by consensus, although notifications pursuant to Resolution
1452 are regularly granted by the Committee.149
Finally, the creation of a humanitarian exception is consistent with
the view that asset freeze is a preventative measure, rather than punishment
for the commission of a crime. Assuming the process is not abused, the
Committee is not concerned with funds being used to cover basic living

143

See Consolidated List, supra note 23.
S.C. Res. 1452, supra note 2, ¶ 1(a).
145
Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council of the E.U., 2006 ECR II-2139, ¶ 130.
146
Id. ¶ 131.
147
S.C. Res. 1452, supra note 2, ¶ 1(b).
148
See Guidelines of the Committee, supra note 71, ¶ 9(a).
149
See Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 47 (“Between August and
October 2006, the Committee received seven notifications pursuant to resolution 1452 (2002)
and approved them all”).
144
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expenses.150 The purpose of the terrorist financial embargo is to keep money
and other financial resources out of the hands of terrorists to prevent the
financing of terrorist activities.
IV. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO U.N. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REGIME
Individuals have challenged their designations and placement on the
Consolidated List on human rights and due process grounds. The majority
of these legal claims have been filed in the United States, United Kingdom,
and the European Union.151 However, in most of these cases, the courts
dismissed applicants’ claims and upheld the sanctions imposed. For example, with respect to designations under Resolution 1267, the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities regularly has rejected applicants’
human rights and due process arguments, upholding application of the sanctions.152 The appeals in three cases brought in the United Kingdom were
dismissed by the courts.153 In another contested action, a Turkish court overturned a lower court decision that would have unfrozen petitioner’s assets,
thereby ending the lawsuit.154 Additionally, U.S. courts regularly have dismissed legal challenges to the Treasury Department’s freeze orders, finding
that the procedures comported with due process principles.155
Two recent legal actions, however, have threatened the continuing
viability of the U.N. economic sanctions program. In April 2008, the U.K.
High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court, held
that the rules implementing U.N. economic sanctions to freeze the assets of
five terror suspects were unlawful because they bypassed Parliament.156 The
150

See Ayadi, 2006 E.C.R. ¶¶ 129–32.
According to the Sanctions Monitoring Team, there have been twenty-six cases challenging the U.N. economic sanctions regime. See Eighth Report of the Monitoring Team,
supra note 14, annex I, ¶¶ 1–8 (listing the pending cases). The following cases have been
filed before the European Court of First Instance: Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the
E.U, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533; Case T–315–01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. 3649;
Case T–253/02, Ayadi v. Council of the E.U., 2006 E.C.R. II-2139; Case T–49/04, Hassan v.
Council & Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. 52; Case T–318/01, Othman v. Council & Comm’n, O.J.
2006 C165/30; Case T-135/06, Al-Faqih v. Council, O.J. 2006 C165/29; Case T–136–06,
Sanabel Relief Agency Ltd. v. Council, O.J. 2006 C165/30; Case T–137/06, Abdrabbah v.
Council; Case T–138/06, Nasuf v. Council, O.J. 2006 C165/30.
152
See Ayadi, 2006 E.C.R. II-2139; Case T-306/01; see also Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533;
see also Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. 3649.
153
See Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, Annex I, ¶ 7.
154
Id., Annex I, ¶ 6. However, the case remains pending on appeal before Turkey’s highest
reviewing body. Petitioner has asked the court to reconsider its prior decision upholding the
freezing of assets. See Eighth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra 14, Annex I, ¶ 6.
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See JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM, 201–14 (2009) (discussing the legal challenges to U.S. freeze orders).
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See A, K, M, Q & G v. H.M. Treasury, [2008] E.W.H.C. 869, ¶ 37.
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U.K. Terrorism Order of 2006 and the 2006 al-Qaeda and Taliban Order
implementing U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333 were
enacted under section 1 of the 1946 United Nations Act. The 1946 Act allows Orders in Council to be used where it is “necessary and expedient.”157
The High Court ruled that the means used to comply with the Security
Council obligations to freeze terrorist-related assets should be subject to the
same Parliamentary scrutiny as normal legislation, rather than by Orders in
Council.158
Finally, in January 2008, an Advocate General for the European
Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction and competence to review actions implementing Security Council resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.159 The Advocate General opined that the regulations
promulgated by the European Union to implement Security Council sanctions to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists infringed on international
due process and human rights standards, including the right to be heard, the
right to effective judicial review by an independent tribunal, and the right to
property.160 According to the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team, if the Advocate General’s position is adopted by the European Court of Justice,
“there is a real possibility that the regulation used by the 27 member States
of the European Union to implement the sanctions will be held invalid.”161
Furthermore, the precedent of such a decision invalidating the sanctions will
likely lead to similar outcomes in other States outside the European Union.162
A.

Arbitrary Deprivation of Property

In Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and
Commission, one of the lower court decisions challenged by the Advocate
General, the European Court of First Instance rejected the applicants’ claims
that the European Union’s (E.U.) sanctions imposed to implement Security
Council Resolution 1267 constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property in
157

Section 1 of the United Nations Act of 1946 authorizes the British government to implement measures taken by the Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations
Charter (not involving the use of armed force) by Order in Council to the extent “necessary
or expedient” for enabling those measures to be effectively applied. Id. ¶ 3.
158
Id. ¶ 49.
159
Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 28, at ¶¶40, 47–55. On January 23, 2008, the
Advocate General issued an advisory opinion reaching a similar conclusion in the companion
appeal of Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Case C-415/05.
160
Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found., 2005 E.C.R. I, ¶¶ 40, 47–55.
161
Eighth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 14, ¶ 40.
162
Id. ¶ 40.
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violation of human rights principles.163 In rejecting the applicants’ claim,
the Court of First Instance stressed the “importance of the fight against international terrorism” and the legitimate role played by the Security Council
in combating threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts.164 The Court viewed the freezing of funds, which were intended to cut
off the flow of funds to terrorists, as “an objective of fundamental public
interest for the international community.”165 The E.U. Court further distinguished between the “freezing” and “confiscation” of assets. The freezing of
assets, the Court stated “does not affect the very substance of the right of the
persons concerned to property in their financial assets but only the use thereof.”166 Unlike confiscation of funds, where title vests in the government,
the applicants continue to own the property. The asset freeze only affects
the use of their property, which constitutes a lesser infringement than those
actions which affect the ownership property.
The E.U. Court also found significant the exceptions to asset freeze
authorized by the Security Council when it adopted Resolution 1452. The
resolution exempts assets necessary to cover basic living expenses, such as
food, rent, medicine and medical care, taxes and public utility charges.167 In
addition, funds necessary for any “extraordinary expenses” may be unfrozen
under Resolution 1452.168 Thus, any infringement on applicants’ property
interests is alleviated by the exemptions permitted by Resolution 1452. Finally, the E.U. Court noted that applicants could petition the Sanctions
Committee for de-listing or removal from the Consolidated List.169 With
regard to the procedures for exceptions and de-listing, and the legitimate
objective served by freezing the assets of persons and entities suspected of
being linked to Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban, the Court held
that the action taken does not constitute an arbitrary interference with or
deprivation of the fundamental right to property.170

163

Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n 2005
E.C.R. II-3533. The applicants advanced three claims. The first two claims challenged the
European Council’s authority to impose sanctions on citizens of the European Union. These
claims were rejected by the Court. See id. ¶¶ 171, 189. The third claim raised challenges to
the procedures afforded applicants and whether they were denied their fundamental rights
under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See id. ¶ 190.
164
Id. ¶¶ 296–98.
165
Id. ¶ 298.
166
Id. ¶ 299.
167
Id. ¶ 290.
168
Id.
169
Id. ¶¶ 301, 309.
170
Id. ¶ 302.
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The Advocate General rejected the reasoning and arguments of the
Court, stating that “the indefinite freezing of someone’s assets constitutes a
far-reaching interference with the peaceful enjoyment of property.”171 Specifically, the Advocate General disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion
that the de-listing procedures developed by the Sanctions Committee minimized any infringement on the right to property. The Advocate General
stated:
The existence of a de-listing procedure at the level of the United Nations
offers no consolation . . . . That procedure allows petitioners to submit a
request to the Sanctions Committee or to their government for removal
from the list. Yet, the processing of that request is purely a matter of intergovernmental consultation. There is no obligation on the Sanctions Committee actually to take the views of the petitioner into account. Moreover,
the de-listing procedure does not provide even minimal access to the information on which the decision was based to include the petitioner in the
list. In fact, access to such information is denied regardless of any substantiated claim as to the need to protect its confidentiality.172

Thus, in the absence of adequate procedural protections, the Advocate General posited that “the freezing of someone’s assets for an indefinite
period of time infringes on the right to property.”173
B.

The Right to a Hearing and Judicial Review

In Yusuf and Barakaat International Foundation, the Court of First
Instance held that lack of notice and a hearing before the applicants’ inclusion on the Consolidated List does not infringe fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.174 The Court divided the issue into two
parts: (1) the right to be heard by the Sanctions Committee before inclusion
on the Consolidated List; and (2) the right to be heard by E.U. institutions

171

Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 27, ¶ 47.
Id. ¶ 51.
173
Id. ¶ 47. In September 2008, after the World Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing, and after the submission of my article, the European Court of Justice issued a decision agreeing with the Advocate General’s arguments and overturning the opinion of the
European Court of First Instance. In Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
Council of the European Union, the European Court of Justice set aside the judgments of the
Court of First Instance holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to review measures
adopted by the E.U. giving effect to resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. See Joined
Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v. Council of the E.U. and Commission of the E.C. (E.C.J. Judgment), Sept. 3,
2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm.
174
Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found., 2005 E.C.R. II–3533, ¶¶ 330–31.
172
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before the adoption of regulations implementing the relevant sanctions.175
The E.U. Court rejected both claims. The Court stated that affording applicants notice and a hearing before the Sanctions Committee prior to being
placed on the List would “jeopardise the effectiveness of the sanctions and
would have been incompatible with the public interest objective pursued.”176
The Court further remarked: “A Measure freezing funds must, by its very
nature, be able to take advantage of a surprise effect and to be applied with
immediate effect. Such a measure cannot, therefore, be the subject-matter of
notification before it is implemented.”177
The E.U. Court stated that the applicants’ fair trial rights were adequately protected by the procedures adopted by the Sanctions Committee
affording them a process for review and de-listing after their designation.178
The Court noted that two of the applicants were in fact heard by the Sanctions Committee through the Swedish government, and their names were
removed from the List.179 Thus, the Court held that lack of notice and a
hearing before the Sanctions Committee prior to one’s inclusion on the
Consolidated List did not offend due process.180
The Court also rejected the applicants’ claim that they were entitled
to notice and a hearing before the E.U. adopted regulations implementing
the sanctions imposed by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.
The Court of First Instance reasoned that the E.U. had transposed into E.U.
legal order, as they were required to do, Security Council resolutions and
decisions of the Sanctions Committee. The Court further opined that it did
not provide for any mechanism for the examination of individual sanctions,
since these matters fell wholly within the competence of the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee.181 As a result, the Court stated:
The Community institutions had no power of investigation, no opportunity
to check the matters taken to be facts by the Security Council and the
Sanctions Committee, no discretion with regard to those matters and no
discretion either as to whether it was appropriate to adopt sanctions vis-àvis the applicants.182

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id. ¶ 305.
Id. ¶ 308 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. ¶ 311–12.
Id. ¶ 318.
See id.
Id. ¶ 328.
Id.
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The Court held that the right to be heard cannot apply in such circumstances and therefore the E.U. institution was not required to hear the
applicants before the contested regulation was adopted.183
Applicants also requested that the Court review the appropriateness
and proportionality of the measures imposed by Security Council Resolution 1267. The Court refused, stating that such a review “entails a political
assessment and value judgments which in principle fall within the exclusive
competence of the authority to which the international community has entrusted primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.”184 The Court stated that it lacked the authority to review whether
the Security Council’s resolutions are compatible with fundamental
rights.185 In other words, the E.U. courts lack the authority to second-guess
designations by the U.N. Sanctions Committee, implementing resolutions
adopted under the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.
The Advocate General reached the opposite conclusion. While the
Court of First Instance identified what essentially amounts to a “rule of primacy,”186 which provides that Security Council resolutions adopted under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter prevail over E.U. law, the Advocate General disagreed, posting:
[I]t would be wrong to conclude that, once the Community is bound by a
rule of international law, the Community Courts must bow to that rule with
complete acquiescence and apply it unconditionally in the Community legal order. The relationship between international law and the Community
legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by
the constitutional principles of the Community.187

According to the Advocate General, measures that are necessary for
the implementation of resolutions adopted by the Security Council do not
retain supra-constitutional status that trump fundamental rights that are part
of general principles of Community law.188 Thus, in his view, the Court of
First Instance erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the contested regulations designed to implement relevant Security Council resolutions.189
183

Id. ¶ 329.
Id. ¶ 339.
185
Id. ¶ 338.
186
Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 27, ¶ 18.
187
Id. ¶ 24.
188
Id. ¶ 40.
189
Id. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Advocate General’s advisory opinion is the
failure to distinguish Article 103 of the U.N. Charter. Article 103 provides: “In the event of a
conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
184
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Shifting to the issue of whether the procedures for designation and
asset freeze violate fundamental rights that form part of general principles
of Community law, the Advocate General agreed with appellants. The Advocate General concluded that the procedures at issue breached the right to
be heard and right to judicial review because they failed to provide “a genuine and effective mechanism of judicial control by an independent tribunal.”190 Instead, the decision whether or not to remove a person from the
Consolidated List remained within the full discretion of the Sanctions
Committee. In other words, de-listing by the Sanctions Committee does not
satisfy the requirement for a hearing and review by an independent and impartial tribunal.
C.

The Right to Notice and a Hearing in Freezing Actions Pursuant to
Resolution 1373

While the European Court of First Instance upheld the designations
and orders of asset freeze under Resolutions 1267 and 1333, the Court
adopted a different approach on the right to notice and a hearing with respect to freezing actions imposed under Resolution 1373.191 In Sison v.
Council of the European Union, the Court invalidated on due process
grounds sanctions imposed on the applicant that were intended to imple-

and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.” The Advocate General failed to adequately explain why Article 103 doesn’t govern any conflict between E.U. treaty law and obligations imposed by
Security Council resolutions adopted pursuant to the Council’s Chapter VII powers. Further,
the Advocate General’s decision omitted any discussion of Article 25, which requires Member States to “carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” Art. 25. The U.N. Sanctions
Committee is an agent of the Security Council which carries out the Council’s mandates.
190
Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 27, ¶ 54. In September 2008, after the
World Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing, and after the submission of my article,
the European Court of Justice issued a decision agreeing with the Advocate General’s arguments and overturning the opinion of the European Court of First Instance. See Joined Cases
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation
v. Council of the E.U. and Commission of the E.C. (E.C.J. Judgment), Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm. The Court further held that regulations enacted by the E.U. infringed on Kadi and Al Barakaat’s fundamental rights under E.U.
Community law. Specifically, the Court held that appellants’ right to be heard and right to
effective judicial review had been violated, and the freezing of funds constitutes a violation
of the right to property. Id.
191
To implement the obligations imposed by Resolution 1373 (2001), the E.U. developed a
legal framework which included the creation of an E.U. list of designated persons whose
funds were to be frozen in accordance with the resolution. The original list of persons,
groups and entities to which the E.U. regulations apply was set out in Council Decision
2001/927/EC, adopted on Dec. 27, 2001. See Case T-327/03, Stitching Al-Aqsa v. Council of
the E.U., 2007 E.C.R. 00, ¶¶ 1–10.
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ment Resolution 1373.192 The E.U. Court distinguished between sanctions
imposed under Resolutions 1267 and 1373.193 Under Resolution 1373, the
Security Council does not identify specific individuals and entities whose
assets must be frozen nor does it promulgate specific procedures for freezing funds. Instead, Member States are permitted to exercise broad discretion
regarding whose funds are to be frozen under procedures developed by each
State.194 The Court reasoned that the exercise of discretion, coupled with the
lack of uniform procedures for determining whose assets should be frozen,
mandated that any decision to freeze assets should be subject to more
searching judicial review.195 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the involvement of the courts in the implementation of Resolution 1373 was justified by the absence of a universally accepted definition of “terrorism” and
“terrorist act” in international law.196
The Court explained that the procedure to impose a measure to
freeze funds pursuant to Resolution 1373 takes place at two levels. Initially,
a competent national authority must decide whether assets are subject to
asset freeze under paragraph 1(c) of the Resolution. Secondly, the E.U.
Council must then decide whether the facts and evidence justify adding the
person to the E.U. list.197 While a person designated pursuant to Resolution
1373 has a right to notice and a hearing, such rights should be safeguarded
by the national court, applying its domestic laws and procedures. The Court
concluded that no right to be heard existed at the E.U. level:
[I]t is not for the Council to decide whether the proceedings instigated
against the party concerned and resulting in that decision, as provided for
by the national law of the relevant Member States, were correctly conducted, or whether the fundamental rights of the party concerned were respected by the national authorities.198

That power, the Court stated, belongs exclusively to the national
court or to the European Court of Human Rights.199 The Council is obligated to defer as far as possible to the assessment conducted by the competent national authority.200 In short, the E.U. Court was reluctant to secondguess the designation decision by the State submitting the name for asset
192

See Case No. T-47/103, Sison v. Council of the E.U., 2007 E.C.R., ¶¶ 226–7, C.M.L.R.
39, 1082 (2007).
193
Id. ¶¶ 147–55.
194
See id. ¶ 151.
195
See id. ¶ 167.
196
Id. ¶ 152.
197
Id. ¶ 164.
198
Id. ¶ 168.
199
Id.
200
Id. ¶ 171.
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freeze.201 However, the Court stated that if the European Council decided to
include that person’s name on the E.U. list and freeze any funds located
within the E.U., the party concerned should be informed by the Council of
the specific information and material in its possession which support a decision to impose measures under Resolution 1373.202 Additionally, the Court
would be required to disclose why it decided to exercise its discretion to
impose sanctions with respect to the party concerned.203 The Court added
that the party then should be afforded an opportunity to make known its
view on the disclosed information and material.204 Finally, any subsequent
decision to continue freezing funds would be preceded by the opportunity
for a hearing and notification of the information relied upon to justify the
decision, including, if applicable, any new incriminating evidence.205 In
other words, the concerned party would be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the European Council making a decision to continue the sanctions.
Nevertheless, with respect to the European Council’s initial decision to adopt the sanctions imposed by a Member State, the Court agreed
with the decision in Yusuf that pre-deprivation notice and hearings “would
be liable to jeopardise the effectiveness of the sanctions and would thus be
incompatible with the public-interest objective pursued . . . in accordance
with Security Council Resolution 1373.”206 Instead, the Court stated that
such persons “should be notified of the evidence against them, insofar as
reasonably possible, either concomitantly with or as soon as possible after
the adoption of the decision to freeze the funds.”207 Thus, a party is not entitled to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing before the European Council
decides whether to place the person on the E.U. list.
At the same time, the right of disclosure of any evidence relied
upon by the Council in deciding to place the party on the E.U. list is not
absolute. The Court stated:
201

See id.
Id. ¶ 173. Case T-327/03, Stitchting Al-Aqsa v. Council of the E.U., 2007, E.C.R. 00, ¶
54 (“[A]n initial decision to freeze funds . . . must at least make actual and specific reference
to the reasons why the Council considers, having regard to the precise information or material in the relevant file available to it, that a decision satisfying the definition given in Article
1(4) has been taken by a competent authority of a Member State in regard of the person
concerned.”).
203
Sison, 2007 E.C.R. ¶ 198. See also Stitchting, 2007 E.C.R. ¶ 54 (“The statement of the
reasons for . . . a decision must . . . indicate why the Council takes the view, in the exercise
of its discretion, that the person concerned must be the subject of such a measure.”).
204
Sison, 2007 E.C.R. ¶ 198.
205
Id.
206
Id. ¶ 175.
207
Id. ¶ 176.
202
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[E]xceptions to the general right to be heard in the course of an administrative procedure are permitted . . . on grounds of public interest, public policy or the maintenance of international relations, or when the purpose of the
decision to be taken would or could be jeopardized if that right were observed.208

Thus, considerations involving security of E.U. Member States, or
the conduct of their international relations, may preclude disclosure to the
parties concerned of certain evidence adduced against them.209 The Court
stated that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights provide that “certain restrictions on the right to a fair hearing may be envisaged, especially concerning disclosure of evidence adduced or terms of
access to the file.”210 The Court suggested that restrictions on access might
include the particular reasoning for designation and even the identification
of the Member State or third country, if disclosure would jeopardize public
security.211
Finally, the Court observed that the European Council enjoys broad
discretion regarding the matters to be taken into consideration in deciding
whether to impose or continue economic sanctions.212 Therefore, a court on
review may not substitute its assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures for that of the Council.213
Instead, the Court opined, the scope of judicial review is limited. The Court
stated that the review must be restricted to “checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that
the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of
assessment of the facts or misuse of power.”214 In short, the Court adopted a
“manifest error” (not de novo) deferential standard of judicial review of
European Council decisions.215
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Id. ¶ 181.
Id. ¶ 180.
210
Id. ¶ 182.
211
Id. ¶ 183.
212
Id. ¶ 206.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
But see Opinion of the Advocate General, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 43–46 (supporting a
broader scope of judicial review).
209
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V. HOLDING STATES ACCOUNTABLE FOR BREACHING THEIR DUTY TO
FREEZE TERRORIST ASSETS
The international legal framework established by the U.N. Security
Council to freeze terrorist-related assets, which is reinforced by the Terrorist
Financing Convention and the FATF Special Recommendation III on Terrorist Financing, is failing. The economic sanctions regime suffers from two
major problems. First, increasingly fewer names are being added to the
Consolidated List each year. In 2007, the number of designations reached an
all-time low when only eight names were added to the List.216 The United
States contributed to the decline by submitting only eleven names for inclusion on the List, a low mark for the United States.217 The terrorist financing
designations have been declining since 2001, when, following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 278 names were placed on the Consolidated
List.218 This downward trend is particularly disturbing considering improvements to the listing procedures, such as the use of a cover sheet to
enhance the quality, accuracy and consistency of identifier information included in Member State submission to the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Committee, and the creation of an administrative focal point to coordinate

216
Consolidated List, supra note 23; see Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra
note 4, ¶ 25 (stating that only five names were added in 2007). However, the Report was
published on November 29, 2007, and the three additional names that appear on the Consolidated List could have been included after the Report was submitted to the Sanctions Committee. See id.
217
Notably, two South African individuals and one related entity were not placed on the
Consolidated List in 2007, nor was Fawzi Mutlaq Al-Rawi, designated by U.S. authorities in
December 2007. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Targets Al-Qaida Facilitators in South Africa (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.ustrea.gov/press/releases/hp230.htm
(designating two South African individuals and a related company); Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Al Qaida, LIFG Operatives (June 15, 2007),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp462.htm (designating three Libyans who are members of al Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates AQIM Emir (Dec. 4, 2007), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
hp708htm; (designating the leader or emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the north
Africa wing of al Qaeda); and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates
Individuals with Ties to Al Qaida, Former Regime (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.ustreas.gov/p
ress/releases/hp720.htm (designating Fawzi Mutlaq Al-Rawi for providing financial support
to Al Qaeda in Iraq). Additionally, three individuals were designated by the Treasury Department on October 10, 2007. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.trea
sury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror.pdf.
218
See Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶¶ 24–25, n. 37 (stating that
the number of designations under Resolution 1267 declined to fifty-four in 2002; seventyseven in 2003; forty-four in 2004; thirty-two in 2005; and twenty-four in 2006).
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petitions for de-listing.219 U.N. counter-terrorism experts maintain that
“[t]he inconsistent relevance of the List to the current [terrorism] threat continues to undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.”220
The sanctions regime also suffers from a lack of implementation by
Member States. After a name is placed on the Consolidated List, States are
required to “freeze without delay” the assets of such persons and entities.221
Failure to take swift action creates a risk that funds intended to finance terrorist activities will be transferred or dissipated to circumvent sanctions.
However, there has been no significant increase in the amount of funds frozen under the sanctions regime since 2004.222 Member States are not freezing terrorist-related assets, despite their obligation to do so pursuant to Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring
Team estimates that ninety-five percent of the total value of the assets frozen to date results from the freezing actions of only nine States.223 The finding of the Monitoring Team suggests that few States are taking seriously
their obligations to freeze al Qaeda-and Taliban-related assets. Even when
names are added to the List, States are reluctant or unwilling to freeze the
assets of those individuals and entities.
Several reasons have been proffered for the decline in the number
of listing submissions to the Committee and the lack of enforcement by
Member States, including the: (1) lack of capacity by certain States to implement economic sanctions;224 (2) lack of identifier information for names
on the List;225 and (3) due process and human rights concerns regarding the
procedures employed for designation.226 While these concerns may have
219

The cover sheet was introduced by Annex I of Resolution 1735. See S.C. Res. 1735,
supra note 2. Resolution 1730 established a focal point for submitting petitions for de-listing.
Id.
220
Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, ¶ 25.
221
S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 2, ¶ 8(c).
222
See Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, annex III.
223
Id. ¶ 58.
224
Id. ¶ 60 (stating that some States have no legal basis to freeze assets and therefore do
not circulate the Consolidated List to banks).
225
Id. ¶ 29; see also U.N. Sec. Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team, Fourth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ¶ 29, U.N.
Doc. S/2006/154 (Mar. 10, 2006).
226
See Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 16; see also EUR. PARL.
ASS., United Nations Security Council and European Blacklists, ¶¶ 22–34, Doc. 11454
(2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07
/EDOC11454.htm; Report, Strengthening Targets Sanctions through Fair and Clear Procedures, The Watson Institute for International Studies (2006), available at http://www.watson
institute.org/pub/strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. The report prepared by the Watson
Institute for International Studies outlined the following recommendations to reduce due
process concerns:
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some merit, and the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee has been
responsive to these concerns, they fail to adequately explain the paucity of
listing submissions and the lack of rigorous enforcement of sanctions by
Member States. Inevitably, this leads to the conclusion that the more likely
reason for State non-compliance is lack of political will.227
A.

Lack of Administrative Capacity

While some States may lack the administrative capabilities and require training and technical assistance to implement the economic sanctions
program, the thirty-four countries that comprise the FATF do not fall within
that category.228 These countries are fully or largely in compliance with
major international standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing and are capable of compliance with relevant anti-terrorist financing
resolutions. Furthermore, countries granted “observer status,” such as India
and the Republic of Korea, which are striving for FATF membership, also
have adequate laws, regulations, procedures and administrative systems in
place to detect and prevent terrorist financing.229 At a minimum, these thirty-six countries have the administrative capabilities to implement the mandates of Resolutions 1267 and 1333. Therefore, the lack of administrative
capacity argument does not explain why only nine countries are responsible
for freezing ninety-five percent of the funds frozen under the international
sanctions regime, or why no countries have frozen terrorist assets since
2004.

(1) detail the criteria for listing in the resolutions; (2) establish general standards
for statements of the case for listings; (3) extend the time period for review of listing proposals from five to 10 working days; (4) require that targets be notified, to
the extent possible, of their listing, the sanctions and procedures for de-listing and
exemptions, and receive a redacted statement of the case and basis for listing; (5)
designate a focal point within the United Nations Secretariat to handle de-listing
and exemption requests and to notify targets of listing; (6) establish a biennial review of listings; (7) set time periods to respond to listing, de-listing and exemption
requests and to establish clear standards for de-listing; and (8) improve websites,
issue more frequent press statements and broadly circulate procedures of the committees.
227
See Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 24 (“[W]hether through lack
of capacity, lack of interest or lack of will, States are no longer as ready to devote time and
energy to preparing written reports to the Council’s counter-terrorism committees.”).
228
FATF Members and Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379
_32236869_1_1_1_1_1,,00.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) (listing the thirty-four countries,
territories, and organizations that have FATF membership).
229
The FATF members would not have afforded India and the Republic of Korea observer
status unless these countries were viewed as being largely compliant, or soon to be compliant, with important international standards on money laundering and terrorist financing.
See FATF, FATF POLICY ON OBSERVERS (June 20, 2008).
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Lack of Accurate Identifier Information

The lack of accurate identifier information argument likewise does
not explain the declining number of new listings and the reluctance of
Member States to freeze the assets of individuals and entities on the List.
The Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team
conservatively estimates that the number of Taliban fighters is between
4,000 and 5,000 men.230 The Taliban Movement of Pakistan is reported to
have a force totaling as many as 40,000 fighters.231 While the revival of the
Taliban continues to accelerate, however, only one Taliban name has been
added to the Consolidated List since February 2001. This includes the failure to add the names of senior leaders of the Taliban.232 For example, neither Mansoor Dadullah, the purported military commander of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, nor Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban Movement in
Pakistan, has been included on the Consolidated List.233
Since 9/11, more than 4,000 people have been arrested or detained
in more than one hundred countries based on their connection to al Qaeda.234 Several dozen members have been convicted for plotting terrorist
attacks, and for providing financial assistance and other material support to
al Qaeda. Only a few hundred individuals and even fewer entities associated
with al Qaeda, however, have been placed on the Consolidated List.235 In
some cases, well-known senior leaders of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
organizations have been omitted from the List. For example, Abu Dujana,
the head of the military wing of Jemaah Islamiya, a Southeast Asian terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda, has not been placed on the List. Indonesian authorities arrested Abu Dujana in the summer of 2007. His arrest is a
matter of public record. The Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team highlighted this problem: “The absence of certain well-known names from the List undermines States’ belief that it is a
current, relevant, dynamic and will-considered list of the key members of

230

Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 6.
Gannon, supra note 34.
232
See Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 8.
233
Other Taliban leaders not included on the Consolidated List include Maulvi Fazlullah,
Faqir Mohammed, Sadiq Noor, and Maulvi Gul Bahadar. Associated Press, Taliban Leaders
in Pakistan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/new/world
/asia/articles/2008/01/26/taliban_leaders_in_pakistan; see also Consolidated List supra note
23.
234
See MICHAEL CHANDLER & ROHAN GUNARATNA, COUNTERING TERRORISM: CAN WE
MEET THE THREAT OF GLOBAL VIOLENCE? 85 (Reaktion Books Ltd. 2007).
235
See id. at 140. With respect to al Qaeda-related designations, approximately 225 individuals and 112 entities have been added to the Consolidated List. See Consolidated List,
supra note 23.
231
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the Taliban, al Qaeda and associated groups.”236 Thus, the paucity of States
submissions for inclusion on the Consolidated List cannot be attributed to
lack of identifier information.
Nor can the lack of action to freeze the assets of individuals and
entities on the terror list be explained by the lack of accurate identifier information. A review of the Consolidated List reveals that names added between 2006 and 2008 included the following identifier information: the individual’s full name, date of birth, place of birth, high-quality aliases, and
one or more additional identifiers, such as address, nationality or passport
number. In short, while not perfect, there is ample identifier information
included on the Consolidated List to reassure States that the assets of the
right person are being frozen.
C.

Due Process Concerns

As previously noted, while several legal actions have been filed
challenging the freezing actions taken under Resolutions 1267, 1333, and
1373, the courts have rejected almost all of those due process claims. In
upholding the sanctions, the E.U. Court of First Instance found that the burden imposed by the economic sanctions was diminished by possible derogations, allowing exceptions for basic living expenses permitted by procedures
adopted by the Sanctions Committee.237 Such legal claims have been regularly denied by courts in the United States as well.238 While the European
Court of Justice has recently ruled on the Kadi case, deciding the matter in
favor of appellant Kadi,239 this decision cannot account for the declining
number of designations that has spanned the last several years.
D.

Lack of Political Will

A more reasonable explanation for the current decline of the international legal regime to freeze terrorist assets is the lack of political will by
certain Member States.240 The States that lack interest in compliance with
Resolutions 1267 and 1333, whether because they question the relevance or
the value of the sanctions, should be reminded that compliance is mandatory. Pursuant to Article 25 of the U.N. Charter, States are required to accept
236

Sixth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 15, ¶ 18.
See Ayadi, 2006 E.C.R. II–2139, ¶¶ 126-32; see also Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. II–3533, ¶¶
329–30; see also Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. 3649, ¶ 259.
238
See Seventh Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 4, at annex I, ¶¶ 7–8.
239
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the E.U. and Commission of the E.C. (E.C.J. Judgment),
Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm.
240
See Fifth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 92, ¶¶ 30 (discussing issues of
compliance, including lack of political will by certain States).
237
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and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.241 The relevant resolutions require Member States to freeze the assets of individuals and entities
included on the Consolidated List. Thus, the duty to freeze the assets of
suspected terrorists and their financial backers is obligatory, not discretionary.242 A State that fails to comply has violated Article 25 of the U.N.
Charter. Additionally, with respect to parties to the Terrorist Financing
Convention, failure to take appropriate measures to freeze terrorist assets
constitutes a breach of Article 8(1) of the Convention.243 Finally, such
States are further in violation of FATF Special Recommendation III, which
requires countries to freeze terrorist-related assets “without delay” in accordance with relevant U.N. resolutions.244
States that demonstrate a consistent disregard of U.N. economic
measures should themselves be subject to sanctions for violating their legal
obligations under principles of international law. The members of the Sanctions Monitoring Team maintain that some type of sanction may be appropriate for non-compliant States. The problem is diplomatically addressed in
the Fifth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team:
Sometimes a State may need a quiet reminder of its obligations in order to
tighten its procedures, but at other times, a more public encouragement
might be necessary . . . . The Committee may need to decide what action to
take in what circumstances . . . . It will want to exhaust every possible
avenue before allowing the situation to become confrontational. The intermediate steps should invoke a close and confidential dialogue between
the Committee and the State concerned . . . to establish the facts and illuminate the underlying reasons for non-compliance.245

While the Security Council might consider imposing economic
measures against non-compliant States pursuant to it Chapter VII powers,
the veto authority possessed by the five permanent members of the Security
Council could make imposition of such measures extremely difficult, if not
impossible.246 Another option for holding non-compliant States accountable
would be to revive the FATF list of non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT), this time including those countries not in compliance with the
241

U.N. Charter art. 25.
The advisory opinion of the Advocate General in the Kadi case challenged this principle. See supra text accompanying note 159.
243
See Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 5, art. 8(1).
244
See Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, supra note 10, at 1.
245
Fifth Report of the Monitoring Team, supra note 92, ¶¶ 30–31 (emphasis added).
246
See U.N. Charter art. 41 (stating that the Security Council “may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. . . .
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”).
242
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Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. Special Recommendation III substantially overlaps with Resolutions 1267 and 1333, requiring States to freeze without delay the funds and other assets and economic resources of persons and entities designated in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions.247
In 2000, the FATF established a procedure to evaluate countries and
territories for compliance with accepted international standards to prevent
money laundering.248 A total of forty-seven countries were examined by
members of FATF in 2000 and 2001, and twenty-three countries were
placed on the FATF NCCT list.249 According to FATF, “[t]he goal of the
initiative [was] to secure the adoption by all financial centres of international standards to prevent, detect and punish money laundering, and thereby
effectively co-operate internationally in the global fight against money
laundering.”250 Being placed on the NCCT list had a sobering yet positive
effect. States realized that being identified by the FATF as an NCCT was
harmful to their reputation in the international community.251 Also, countries appreciated that adopting current anti-money laundering standards was
important for the protection and soundness of their financial systems.252
Most NCCT countries immediately began to improve their anti-money
laundering regimes after being listed.253 All twenty-three countries were
eventually removed from the NCCT list for implementing effective measures to prevent money laundering and no additional jurisdictions are currently being reviewed under this process.254
A similar process could be implemented to ensure State compliance
with international standards on terrorist financing. The U.N. Sanctions
Committee or Monitoring Team could identify States for evaluation by the
FATF. The members of the Monitoring Team would work closely with the
FATF, sharing its expertise, experience and knowledge on lack of State
compliance with Resolutions 1267 and 1333, and jointly they could prepare
a report outlining areas of deficiency. The States concerned would be afforded an opportunity to comment on the report and provided a time line for
implementing needed changes to ensure compliance with the duty to freeze
247

See Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, supra note 10, at 1.
See FATF, Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, § I (Feb. 14, 2007)
(explaining the NCCT review process and criteria defining non-cooperative countries or
territories).
249
FATF, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006–2007:
Eighth NCCT Review, ¶ 6 (Oct. 12, 2007).
250
Id. ¶ 5.
251
Id. ¶ 7.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
See id. at annex 3 (stating that, as of October 13, 2006, there were no NCCTs).
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terrorist assets. Failure to implement needed changes could result in the
States being placed on the terrorist financing NCCT list. The thereat of being placed on the list would have a deterrent effect and cause States to enhance their anti-terrorist financing regimes to avoid being included on the
terrorist financing list.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.N. economic sanctions program to prevent the financing of
terrorism has reached a critical juncture. Legal challenges threaten the continued viability of the U.N. asset freeze program. As stated in the Eighth
Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team: “It is
difficult to imagine that the Security Council could accept any review panel
that appeared to erode its absolute authority to take action on matters affecting international peace and security, as enshrined in the Charter.”255 Member States will be emboldened to second-guess Sanctions Committee decisions or simply ignore those designations with which they disagree.
At the same time, the current U.N. legal framework to prevent the
financing of terrorism suffers from lack of enforcement. Member States are
reluctant or unwilling to submit names for inclusion on the Consolidated
List. Equally disturbing, countries are not freezing the assets of persons and
entities whose names appear on the List. States must be held accountable for
lack of cooperation and breach of their legal duties imposed by Security
Council resolutions, the Terrorist Financing Convention, and international
standards on terrorist financing developed by the FATF. Member States that
willfully fail to comply with their international obligations to freeze terrorist-related funds should be placed on a list of non-cooperative countries or
subject to other U.N.-tailored sanctions.
Moreover, the United States needs to assume a greater leadership
role in the implementation of Resolutions 1267 and 1333. The submission
of twenty-five names for listing in 2007 by the Treasury Department, when
al Qaeda and the Taliban retain ample funding and remain a serious threat to
international security, is unacceptable.256 The United States must lead by
example. At the very least, the Treasury Department needs to ensure that the
names of the senior leaders of al Qaeda, the Taliban and affiliated terrorist
organizations are included on the Consolidated List. In short, the failure to
enforce legal duties and obligations imposed by Security Council Resolu255

U.N. Sec. Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Report of the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Pursuant to Resolution 1735 (2006)
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, ¶ 41, U.N.
Doc. S/2008/324 (May 14, 2008).
256
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism: What You Need to
Know about U.S. Sanctions, available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
programs/ascii/terror.txt.
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tions 1267 and 1333 against non-compliant States runs the risk of rendering
the U.N. sanctions regime to freeze terrorist assets irrelevant in the fight
against global terrorism.

